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Lewis Kirshner’s recent study Intersubjectivity in Psychoanalysis: A Model for 
Theory and Practice presents a highly readable and long-needed synoptic account of 
the diverse meanings and conceptualizations of intersubjectivity informing current 
psychoanalytic practice. Kirshner notes that the term ‘intersubjectivity’ was not 
commonly invoked in psychoanalytic theorizing before 1980, yet from the 1980’s 
onwards its use has increased dramatically. The concept of intersubjectivity within 
psychoanalysis is most closely associated with the interpersonal turn that has roots in 
Sandor Ferenzci’s early critique of the analyst playing a neutral or objective role in 
interpreting the unconscious meaning of symptoms and Harry Stack Sullivan’s 
critique of Freud’s concept of anxiety as predominantly a signal anxiety to the ego 
indicating the imminent emergence of hitherto repressed ideas into conscious 
awareness. Sullivan emphasized that anxiety can also originate from concern about 
the social responses and approval of valued or important others, a point that accords 
with contemporary evolutionary accounts of anxiety and depression. Kirshner notes 
how Ferenzci’s critique of the analyst’s neutral/objective role is later echoed by 
Stanley Leavy, a less well-known American psychoanalyst influenced by his reading 
of Lacan during the late 60’s / early 70’s. Summarizing Leavy’s position, Kirshner 
(2017, p. 54) states that for Leavy psychoanalysis involves,  
 
the joint immersion of analyst and patient in language and the unfolding, changing 
meaning growing out of the exchange of words… [Leavy] anticipated the current 
formulations of the analytic relationship as primarily an interactive process of 
mutual influence rather than an applied science.  
 
Kirshner systematically explores how notions of intersubjectivity from outside the 
field of psychoanalysis have influenced the development of psychoanalytic theory and 
practice, notably from phenomenological philosophy and the neuroscience of 
empathy, mirroring, and attachment. On the topic of the neuroscience of 
intersubjectivity, Kirshner emphasizes both the value and utility of biologically rooted 
approaches to social cognition in establishing the basic parameters of mutual 
influence and, in turn, the limitations of a reductionist-biological approach for the 
particular psychoanalytic purpose of understanding unique subjectivities which 
                                                1	  Correspondence	  concerning	  this	  article	  should	  be	  addressed	  to	  Christopher	  R.	  Bell,	  Department	  of	  Psychology,	  University	  of	  Southern	  Indiana,	  8600	  University	  Blvd,	   Evansville,	   IN	   47712	   USA.	   E-­‐mail:	   crbell1@usi.edu	   or	  chrisramonbell@gmail.com	  




constitutively overlooks the idiosyncratic linguistic expressions of analysands 
emerging from their singular personal histories. While Kirshner notes that an 
evolutionary accounting of emotions is indispensable for a general understanding of 
the purpose and functioning of emotions, he adds that the unconscious and fantasy 
form a kind of ‘superstructure’ that necessarily modulates how emotions are 
experienced and expressed.  Kirshner (2017, p. 85) states,   
 
…the perceptions that ostensibly trigger core emotions are themselves active 
products of the subject’s expectations and history of social learning.  The 
confirmation of Darwin’s hypotheses that our emotional lives are shared with other 
animals as inherited dispositions and that their overt manifestation follows a 
common biological program does not negate the crucial role of higher level cultural 
and personal experiences in shaping subjective feeling and expression of affects.  
 
As such, Kirshner emphasizes both phylogenetic and ontogenetic contributions to the 
shaping and expression of affects, a process that incorporates universal human 
emotions, particular cultural conditioning, and idiosyncratic subjective perceptions of 
experience related to personal history and present context. 
 
Considering phenomenology’s influence on the development of an intersubjective 
perspective in psychoanalysis, Kirshner recounts how Robert Stolorow’s work 
precipitated an ‘intersubjective’ turn in psychoanalysis during the early 1980’s.  
Stolorow, originally inspired by Kohut’s emphasis on empathy, increasingly espoused 
a vision of psychoanalysis that dispensed with any and all metapsychological 
theorizing in favor of acknowledging the primacy of the intersubjective experience of 
the analytic encounter. Stolorow’s radical emphasis on the primacy of intersubjectivity 
undoubtedly corrected for the tendency of psychoanalytic metapsychology to install 
the analyst in the role of a detached scientist-observer who could objectively interpret 
the analysand’s unconscious. However, Stolorow’s over-correction ineluctably led to 
the untenable position that an analysand’s unconscious is no longer central to 
psychoanalytic work.  Kirshner (2017) thus wonders whether a form of psychoanalysis 
no longer oriented towards an analysand’s unrepresented desire could still be regarded 
as psychoanalytic. 
 
Kirshner continues by considering the contributions of a distinctively American 
Relational Psychoanalysis that emerged during the 1980’s, focusing on the work of 
Jessica Benjamin and Lewis Aron. While Kirshner notes that Relational 
Psychoanalysis moved decidedly from a ‘1-person’ model of therapeutic action 
focused on the objective interpretation of an analysand’s intra-psychic drives to a ‘2-
peron’ model that highlighted the distinct ‘intersubjective field’ created between 
analyst and analysand, the updated 2-person model introduced a new and potentially 
intractable difficulty in the form of a Hegelian battle for mutual recognition.  Kirshner 
here takes a nuanced position on this difficulty that usefully combines Relational with 
Lacanian perspectives, potentially addressing theoretical lacunae in each approach.  




On the one hand, Kirshner notes that analysis does effectively involve mutual 
influence between analyst and analysand that leads to the creation of a distinct 
‘intersubjective field’.  On the other hand, the intersubjectivity created is by no means 
an equitable relationship involving a reasonable ‘balance of powers’ or a reciprocal 
relationship of ‘give and take’ between both parties.  Rather, psychoanalysis is 
structurally asymmetrical in so far as one person is requesting analysis by another, the 
very fact of this indicating transference and the positioning of the analyst as a subject-
supposed-to-know. Thus Kirshner (2017, p. 62) summarizes “while analytic therapists 
themselves may undergo significant psychological changes as a consequence of 
clinical interactions, the process remains inherently unequal and asymmetrical”. If 
analysis does in fact create an intersubjective field, it is one operating at conditions far 
from equilibrium. 
 
The difficulties with a 2-person model eventually became evident to Relational 
theorists who subsequently developed various models of an ‘analytic third’ position to 
keep analysis moving in a productive direction rather than grinding to a halt in a 
stalemate of mutual admiration or antipathy.  While Kirshner highlights that Lacanian 
theory expressly emphasizes such a ‘third’ dimension with its concept of the Name-of-
the-Father that psychically separates mother from child and sets the nascent subject on 
a path marked by lack and desire, rather than a less desirable path of confronting a 
non-dialectical demand, Kirshner is also critical of Lacan’s rather impersonal notion of 
the Symbolic Other that would apparently negate an analyst’s own subjectivity and the 
influence of his or her subjectivity on analysands. Regarding this, Kirshner (2017, p. 
127) writes, 
 
Lacan repudiated intersubjectivity for supporting a pre-psychoanalytic conception 
of complete subjects and denying the asymmetry of transference. This change 
accompanied his turn from phenomenology towards more abstract and formal 
models of mathemes (algebraic formulae) and the theory of knots, which came to 
occupy his attention. Yet although some phenomenologists appear to hold 
conceptions incompatible with a psychoanalytic view of the unconscious (and 
divided subject), intersubjectivity does not necessarily imply a complete or 
coherent subject and can accommodate the inequality of the analytic (and other 
forms of) relationship.  Something was lost in Lacan’s response to the riddle of the 
subject by moving the analyst from the interactive field portrayed in his 1953 paper 
to the impersonal place of the Other in the transference. 
 
Kirshner maintains that erasing the analyst’s own subjectivity from the analytic 
situation, in Lacanian terms what might be said to be ‘real’ about the analyst—the 




analyst’s own unsymbolized hopes, wishes, predilections, and impasses—fails to 
acknowledge the actuality of intersubjectivity qua mutual influence that does 
effectively transpire within the psychoanalytic encounter. Moreover, Kirshner (2017, 
p. 139) emphasizes that the “task of the therapist in his culturally designated role” 
involves humanistic ideals that do in fact form positive prescriptions influencing not 
only an analyst’s role but also highlight the analyst’s own desire in choosing this role.  
For Kirshner (2017), these humanistic ideals involve a combination of empathy, 
recognition, and responsiveness, which inform psychoanalysis beyond or in addition 
to Lacan’s impersonal desire for difference.   
 
Kirshner’s inquiry into intersubjectivity opens up the space for a potentially 
productive dialogue between Relational and Lacanian perspectives that illuminates 
theoretical blindspots of each and contributes to the further development of 
psychoanalytic theory. However, one area of intersubjectivity that Kirshner leaves 
entirely unaddressed are the significant generational differences between most 
psychoanalysts and their younger analysands, leaving open questions about how 
psychoanalysis can adjust to address common symptoms prevalent in younger 
generations. According to Paul Verhaeghe (2008, p. 2), such symptoms include higher 
rates of “panic disorder, ADHD, somatization, eating disorders, difficulties in impulse 
control, self-mutilation, drug abuse, sexual and aggressive acting out, [and] an always 
vague combination of anxiety and depression”.  Regarding the therapeutic alliance, 
Verhaeghe (2008, p. 1) notes that “the development of a useful therapeutic alliance is 
not forthcoming.  Instead, we meet with an absent-minded, indifferent attitude, 
together with distrust and a generally negative transference.  Indeed, such a patient 
would have been refused by Freud”. If both contemporary forms of transference and 
contemporary symptoms differ so markedly from the typical transference and 
symptoms encountered in times past, how might psychoanalytic notions of 
intersubjectivity acknowledging of difference yet informed by empathy, recognition, 
and responsiveness address the ‘new disorders’ of today?  With this being said, 
Kirsher’s Intersubjectivity in Psychoanalysis: A Model for Theory and Practice 
provides a thorough an indispensable guide to the various conceptions of 
intersubjectivity informing current psychoanalytic practice, and will be of particular 
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